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Abstract 
 
Brazil has encouraged an ambitious set of policies toward the pharmaceutical industry, aiming 
to foster technological development while meeting health requirements. We characterize these 
efforts, labeled the “Health-Industry Complex” (Complexo Industrial da Saúde, CIS), as an 
outcome of incremental policy change backed by the sustained efforts of public health 
professionals within the federal bureaucracy. As experts with a particular vision of the 
relationship between health, innovation, and industry came to dominate key institutions, they 
increasingly shaped government responses to emerging challenges. Step by step, these 
professionals first made science and technology essential aspects of Brazil’s health policy, 
and then merged the Ministry of Healths’s new focus on science, technology, and health, with 
industrial policy measures aimed toward private firms. We contrast this depiction of these 
policy changes with a conventional view that relies on partisan orientation of the Executive. 
 
Key words: Pharmaceutical Industry; Science and Technology; History of Public Health; 
Health Policy 
 
Latin American countries have historically treated policies for organizing and 
managing health systems and policies regarding science and technology as distinct areas, with 
limited integration between the two. Health policymakers have been concerned with health 
services provision, while officials in development ministries and agencies have focused on 
investments related to the promotion and use of technologies. In Brazil, however, running 
contrary to this tendency, the two dimensions of public policy have become fused, with the 
alignment of health policy with measures to promote scientific and technological 
development of the pharmaceutical industry. This paper examines the process of 
transformation of health policy in Brazil.
 
 
Prior to the 1990s, health policies and science and technology policies in Brazil bore 
little relationship to each other; in fact often they were in conflict and undermined each other. 
3 
 
And to the extent that health-related innovation and production were on the public policy 
agenda, the main focus was on public production of medicines, with little concern for or 
engagement with the activities of private industry. However, since the mid-2000s the 
Brazilian Ministry of Health (MoH) has adopted a series of initiatives for the establishment 
and expansion of the “Health-Industry Complex” (Complexo Industrial da Saúde, CIS). These 
initiatives have included, for example, incentives for production and technological 
development in the biomedical sector, mechanisms to promote technology and knowledge 
transfers from large multinational pharmaceutical companies to Brazilian companies, and 
coordination among various ministries and state agencies involved with promoting science 
and technology (S&T). The integration between public policies in health, science and 
technology, and industry is unprecedented in Brazil. 
The array of new science and technology and industrial policy initiatives that 
contribute to the CIS respond directly to the needs of Brazil’s health system. The country has 
one of the world’s largest universal public health systems, called the National Health System 
(Sistema Único da Saúde, SUS).
1
 Coverage includes substantial expenditures on medicines 
(for example, the high-cost treatment of diseases like cancer, HIV/AIDS, and hepatitis) and 
other health products and services. The demands created by so many obligations in health led 
to the urgent need for a more vibrant industrial sector, and the CIS, a pioneering step that 
greatly expands the volume of resources dedicated to health-oriented industrial policies, is 
envisioned and designed as a package of measures to reform the country’s science and 
technology and industrial bases in order to satisfy the large and ever-expanding needs of the 
SUS. 
Not only does the CIS invest in industry for the sake of health, but it also treats 
investments in health as a driving force of economic development. In doing so, the logic of 
the CIS differs from the traditional public health model, which focuses on identifying the 
most efficient ways to improve “health.”2 The CIS model understands the health sector as 
involving a wide range of interconnected industries and activities (e.g. pharmaceuticals, 
diagnostics, healthcare services, medical devices,) which jointly, in addition to contributing to 
the delivery of healthcare, can be the source of broader technological change and economic 
development. CIS speaks directly to an emerging global health agenda that calls for enhanced 
                                                          
1
 Though available to all Brazilians, in effect the SUS serves approximately 75% of the 
country’s population, with roughly 25% of the population opting for private health insurance. 
2
 Marco Di Tommaso and Stuart Schweitzer, Health policy and high-tech industrial 
development: learning from innovation in the health industry (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2005). 
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integration between health and industrial objectives, and also supports local production of 
pharmaceuticals in low- and middle-income countries.
3
 
 Our analysis of the CIS builds on a substantial body of research.
4
 Various authors have 
endeavored to understand the expansion of Brazil’s health-oriented science and technology 
and industrial policies in the 2000s, under the governments of Presidents Luís Inácio Lula da 
Silva (Lula) and Dilma Rousseff of the Workers Party (PT), but few have discussed the 
underlying motivations in the decision to foment actions for the CIS. One explanation might 
be the emergence of political movements situated on the left of the political spectrum and the 
“developmentalist” orientation of the PT governments of the early 2000s.5 Yet explanations 
that attribute the CIS to the orientation of the incumbent government and the general thrust 
toward renewed industrial policies of the 2000s are problematic from a temporal perspective: 
the Health-Industry Complex has its roots in the period prior to the Lula government. To be 
sure, the choices made by the post-2003 PT governments are of major importance, but the 
process did not start with these governments. In order to understand the policy options 
available to the PT governments in the 2000s, it is essential to understand the trajectory of 
science and technology in health over time and how past choices facilitated the initiatives that 
ultimately produced the CIS.  
                                                          
3
 United Nations, ‘Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development’, 
(New York: United Nations, 2015); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
‘Local production of pharmaceuticals and related technology transfer in developing 
countries: A series of case studies by the UNCTAD secretariat’, (Geneva: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2011). 
4
 Lia Hasenclever, Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira, Julia Paranhos, Gabriela Chaves (eds.), 
Desafios de operação e desenvolvimento do complexo industrial da saúde, (Rio de Janeiro: e-
papers, 2016); Ana Luiza Viana, Aylene Bouquat, Nelson Ibanez (eds.), Saúde 
desenvolvimento, ciência, tecnologia e inovação, (São Paulo, Hucitec, 2012); see also the 
special edition of the journal Cadernos de Saúde Pública/Reports in Public Health 32:supl.2 
2016; Kenneth Shadlen and Elize Fonseca, 'Health Policy as Industrial Policy: Brazil in 
Comparative Perspective', Politics and Society, 41:4 (2013), pp. 560 - 86 
5
 Antoine Metten, Laís Costa, Carlos Gadelha and José Maldonado, 'A introdução do 
complexo econômico industrial da health na agenda de desenvolvimento: uma análise a partir 
do modelo de fluxos múltiplos de Kingdon', Revista de Administração Pública, 49:4 (2015), 
pp. 915-36; Ana Luiza Viana & Paulo Elias, ‘Saúde e desenvolvimento’, Ciência e Saúde 
Coletiva, 12: Suppl (2007), pp.1765-1777; Carlos Gadelha & Laís Silveira, ‘Saúde e 
Desenvolvimento Nacional: a gestão federal entre 2003 e 2010’, in Cristiani Machado, 
Tatiana Vargas, Luciana Lima (eds.), Políticas de Saúde no Brasil: continuidades e mudanças 
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fiocruz, 2012). Although the main objective of the studies by Viana 
& Elias and Gadelha & Silveira was not to explain the political process in the formation of the 
CIS, they attribute to the incumbent Administration the option for pro-development policies 
that backed the policies for the pharmaceutical sector. 
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Emphasis on the Executive’s ideological orientation also risks overlooking the 
relevant role of the federal bureaucracy. There are sound reasons to expect the state 
bureaucracy to matter for the development of the CIS, consistent with studies of industrial 
development in Brazil that show state actors’ crucial roles in industrial policymaking.6 Since 
many analyses of industrial development in Brazil examine events that occurred during the 
military regime (1964-1985), the experience of the CIS also provides an opportunity to 
explore the role of the bureaucracy in the recent period. Matthew Flynn, one of the few 
authors to mention the federal bureaucracy’s role when examining contemporary health and 
industrial policies, attributes the emergence of Brazil’s industrial policy for medicines for 
HIV/AIDS to an alliance between the bureaucracy, local industry, and civil society.
 7
 Flynn, 
like many other analyststs of the CIS, emphasizes the role of a group of intellectuals, public 
health professionals, and leftist politicians – collectively refereed to as sanitaristas – working 
within the federal bureaucracy to promote sweeping reforms such as the creation of a national 
public health system and policies to respond to HIV/AIDS.
8
 The sanitaristas’ role in the 
federal bureaucracy dates to the military regime, when these actors were invited to join the 
Ministry of Health in order to expand the legitimacy of a government which until then had 
been impervious to civil society’s interests, and then grew substantially in the 1990s.9 Our 
analysis complements and builds on this research by extending the anslysis of the role of 
public health professionals in the formulation of public policy beyond health per se, 
examining instead their role in creating a coalition for a broader industrial policy related to 
health, the CIS.   
We argue in this article that a process of institutional change occurred incrementally, 
over a long period of time. The Health-Industry Complex, launched in 2007 and implemented 
in the following decade, resulted from gradual changes in science, technology, and health 
                                                          
6
 Ben Ross Schneider, Politics Within the State: Elite Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in 
Authoritarian Brazil, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991). 
7
 Matthew Flynn, Pharmaceutical Autonomy and Public Health in Latin America: State, 
society and industry in Brazil's AIDS Program (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
8
 Sarah Escorel, Reviravolta na saúde: origem e articulação do movimento sanitário (Rio de 
Janeiro, Ed. Fiocruz, 1999); Amy Nunn, The Politics and History of AIDS Treatment in Brazil 
(New York: Springer, 2008); Jessica Rich, ‘Grassroots Bureaucracy: Intergovernmental 
Relations and Popular Mobilization in Brazil’s AIDS Policy Sector’, Latin America Politics 
and Society, 55:2 (2013), pp. 1-25. 
9
 Tulia Falleti, ‘Infiltrating the State: The evolution of health care reforms in Brazil, 1964-
1998’, in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Explaining Institutional Change: 
ambiguity, agency, and power, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Nunn, The 
Politics and History of AIDS Treatment in Brazil.  
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policies that were initiated soon after the democratic transition of the late 1980s. We identify 
points of policy “layering” over time, as new initiatives were introduced, and we show that 
these gradual changes were spearheaded by groups of public health researchers gaining space 
within the federal bureaucracy.
 10
 By the the mid-2000s, a segment of these researchers, 
occupying central positions in health policy decision-making, provided important impetus for 
the CIS. The initiatives advanced by this group, anchored in the premise that innovation in 
health technologies was essential and that the relationship between the state and private 
groups was criticial for achieving these goals, differ substantially from Brazil’s public health 
tradition.  
Our analysis is rooted in the literature on gradual institutional change.
11
 A 
fundamental premise of this approach is that institutional change reflects perceptions of rules’ 
inadequacy, processes of reinterpretation, and the establishment of new social and political 
coalitions, all of which can culiminate in transformation but occur gradually.
12
 This can be 
thought of as a change-by-layering model, by which institutions undergo modifications via 
the processes of amendment and revision of existing rules. However, in addition to minor 
alterations occurring over long periods of time, the accrued weight of small changes can also 
create moments of opportunity for policymakers to promote more sweeping changes.
13
  
Another premise for this literature is the role assigned to social and political actors in 
processes of institution-building and and institutional change. Previously, the literature on 
institutionalism assigned greater historical weight to structure and design, with political 
actors’ agency only considered important during moments of institutional rupture or crisis. 
Thelen and Mahoney, challenging this perspective, present a typology of actors that can drive 
different types of incremental change. In the case of layering, changes are usually introduced 
                                                          
10
 Kathelen Thelen and James Mahoney (eds.), Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, 
Agency, and Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Faletti, ‘Infiltrating the 
State.' 
11
 Wolfgang Streeck and Kathelen Thelen, 'Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
Economies', in Wolfgang Streeck and Kathlen Kathelen Thelen (eds.), Beyond Continuity: 
Institutional change in advanced political economies (Oxford / New York: Open University 
Press, 2005), pp. 1-39.  
12
 Thelen and Mahoney, Explaining Institutional Change; Giovanni Capoccia, 'When Do 
Institutions “Bite”? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional change', 
Comparative Political Studies, 49:8 (2016), pp. 1-33. 
13
 Jan Olsson, 'Politics as Institutional Subversion: a neglected mechanism in explaining 
institutional change and continuity', International Conference on Public Policy (1-4 July), 
(Milan, 2015); B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, and Desmond S. King, "The Politics of Path 
Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism," The Journal of Politics 67, 
no. 4 (November 2005): 1275-1300. 
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by “subversive” actors, labelled as such because they promote changes within institutions and 
on the fringes of existing rules, rather than through more obvious mobilizations against the 
status quo.
14
 Subversive actors introduce their agendas gradually, without breaching existing 
rules, but building or promoting minor alterations that accumulate over time and lead to 
incremental change; they initiate processes of change from the periphery until finding 
pathways leading to core. The evolution of the CIS in Brazil illustrates these dynamics.  
The remainder of the article is organized in four sections. The next section explores 
the emergence of a new agenda science and technology policy in coordination with national 
health policies. For decades there was little dialogue between actions in health, industry, and 
science and technology in Brazil. Although they dealt with related issues, the management 
and development of these policies were distinct realities. Gradually, health policy integrated 
science and technology issues on the federal agenda, which served as the basis for actions in 
the Health-Industry Complex. The second part discusses the role of a group of public health 
professionals as agents of change. We present the development of their positions and specific 
experiences with technology transfer in a research institution affiliated with the Ministry of 
Health. Finally, the third part analyzes the alignment of science and technology policies as 
related to health, with industrial policies. Here, in contrast to the past when health 
professionals were averse to working with private industry, now we see health professionals 
embracing an approach to health and industrial policies that include an important role for 
private firms. All of these changes illustrate processes of layering, in that we witness the 
overlaying of new initiatives on existing practices, than deconstruction and replacement of 
past policies and practices. In the conclusion, we summarize the principal findings, the 
article’s contributions, and suggestions for further research.  
The study is based on data collected from 2012 to 2016, including government 
documents (legislation, official speeches, documents from ministries and other government 
agencies) and newspaper articles, as well as thirty interviews held with key informants 
representing government, the private sector, academia, and civil society groups, selected 
according to their participation in this process and/or their ability to comment on the evolution 
of science and technology and health in Brazil. To increase the information’s validity, we 
used the following protocols: we revised the context and the policies before each interview in 
order to identify possible incoherencies and inconsistencies during the interview; we 
                                                          
14
 Thelen and Mahoney (eds.), Explaning Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and 
Power. 
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triangulated primary data with other document sources and interviews; we contacted some 
informants more than once in order to clarify inconsistences.  
 
Building a science and technology agenda in health 
 
 In the late 1980s, following the demise of the military regime, Brazil’s health system 
underwent profound reform, with a highly centralized model based on social contributions 
replaced by a decentralized and universal model. The health reform movement advocating 
these changes consisted of physicians and intellectuals who sought to expand access to health 
and to promote an understanding of health as a social right. Science and technology were 
secondary issues on the agenda, overshadowed by more urgent issues such as the expansion 
of free access to health services and the financial stability of the new universal healthcare 
system, the SUS.
 15
 To the extent that science and technology emerged on the agenda, this 
tended to be limited to state investments in public laboratories and government production of 
medicines. Research reveals a hanful of events and publications on science and technology 
related to health produced by researchers at the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), the 
leading biomedical research institution in Latin America, affiliated with the Brazilian 
Ministry of Health and birthplace of the country’s health reform movement.16  
 It is important to take a step back and contextualize that Brazil experienced different 
cycles in terms of the interaction between health policy and its industrial base without a 
formal agenda or clear objectives on what might constitute a science and technology policy 
appropriate for health.
17
 The production of medicines in Brazil dates to the early 20
th
 century, 
financed largely by the state for the development of vaccines for the health system, to prevent 
and combat major endemics.
 
There was a limited presence of private pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, and they were largely ignored by public policy (even in health regulatory 
policy, which focused on inspecting ports and controlling endemics). After the 1930s, with 
                                                          
15
 Nilson Costa, 'Inovação Política, Distributivismo e Crise: A Política de Saúde nos Anos 80 
e 90', Dados, 39:3 (1996), pp. 423-78. 
16
 Sergio Arouca, 'Política de imunobiológicos e tendências atuais da política de saúde', in 
Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (ed.), 1o Seminário: Qual política tecnológica para que política de 
saúde?, (Rio de Janeiro, 1987); Marilia Marques, Ciência, Tecnologia, Saúde e 
Desenvolvimento Sustentado (Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz, 1991), Marilia Marques, Por uma 
política de ciência e tecnologia em saúde no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz, 1998). 
17  Ana Luiza Viana, Hudson Silva, Nelson Ibanez, Fabiola Iozzi, ‘A política de 
desenvolvimento produtivo da saúde e a capacitação dos laboratórios públicos 
nacionais’, Cad. Saúde Pública, 32:suppl.2 (2016), pp.s1-s14. 
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the emergence of the international pharmaceutical industry, the context in Brazil was marked 
by entry and dominance of foreign firms as suppliers of health products (e.g. equipment, 
medicines). Indeed, in the post-World War II period, the academics and public health 
professionals began to call attention to the “de-nationalization of the pharmaceutical 
industry,” which, they contended, could posed threats to the country’s financial situation and 
also public health.
18
 These researchers recommended various measures to build and 
strengthen the country’s production capacities, including initiatives to stimulate local 
production of medicines by state laboratories and the creation of a state pharmaceutical 
company.
19
 At this stage, however, public health researchers tended to be hostile to the 
private sector, particularly the multinational pharmaceutical companies that dominated the 
sector but domestic firms as well. To the extent that the health researchers concerned 
themselves with production, their focus was on state production.   
Some steps to strengthen the domestic production of medicines, both by government 
and private manufacturers, were taken during the military regime. These included, for 
example, further reforms to the intellectual property law to limit patents on pharmaceuticals, 
the creation of the Central de Medicamentos (CEME) with the responsibilities of regulating 
and distributing medicines produced by public laboratories, and an array of tariff and tax 
incentives to stimulate the local production of drugs by private, Brazilian pharmaceutical 
firms. Driving these changes was a nationalist group in the Armed Forces that viewed 
domestic production of medicines as a national security issue,
20
 but subsequent initiatives 
were typically spread across different government agencies, and their effects were thus 
limited. As one public health official declared in the early 1980s, “there is no Brazilian 
pharmaceutical industry, but only a pharmaceutical industry in Brazil” (p. 169).21  
Brazil’s science and technology framework with regard to health was built slowly. The 
democratic transition of the 1980s created opportunities for building a health agenda that was 
linked to science and technology, and some incipient steps were taken in this period, but for 
the most part policy remained disarticulated across these realms. An important event, for 
example, was the first National Conference on Science and Technology in Health, organized 
in 1994 by the Ministry of Health, with the support of the Association of Researchers in 
                                                          
18
 Ediná Costa, Vigilância sanitária: proteção e defesa da saúde (São Paulo: Sobravime, 
2004). 
19
 Madel Luz, As instituições médicas do Brasil (Porto Alegre: Rede Unida, 2014) 
20
 Costa, 'Vigilância sanitária: proteção e defesa da saúde' 
21
 José Saraiva, ‘Política nacional de medicamentos’, Revista Brasileira de Educação Médica, 
7:3 (1983): pp.167-178. 
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Collective Health (ABRASCO). This event focused attention on the relationship between 
health policy and science and technology policy, and, importantly, created a platform for 
actions to be taken. In order to institutionalize science and technology in the Ministry of 
Health, for example, the final report of the Conference recommended the creation of a 
Secretariat of Science and Technology in Health.
22
 Yet, despite these efforts, little interaction 
followed between the MoH and other government agencies to promote a broad and cohesive 
agenda in science, innovation, and health; different actors in the state continuing to work on 
their own agendas, separately, remained the order of the day. Indeedm, the demand for a 
specialized unit on Science and Technology within the Ministry of Health was only partialy 
met with the creation of a department responsible for science and technology at the MoH, as 
we will discuss below. The lack of coordination was so serious that in 1996, after a 
controversial period of negotiation, the Brazilian National Congress not only passed a new 
intellectual property law which, as required by the World Trade Organization, meant that the 
country would begin to grant patents medicines, consequently increasing the price of the 
original name brand drugs, but it also enacted a law that guaranteed universal access to AIDS 
drugs – many of which would be made more expensive precisely because of the new 
intellectual property law.
23
 In short, significant and impactful decisions were still being made 
seemingly without in-depth discussions or debates on relationships between various laws and 
their potential implications and contradictions.
24
  
We observe the Ministry of Health focusing more explicitly on science and technology 
later in 2000, as indicated by the establishment of the Department of Science and Technology 
(DECIT). This change, which we can regard as an instance of “layering,” with the addition of 
new roles for an existing institution, were motivated by public health emergencies that were 
regarded as evidence of the incipient nature of actions in health-related science and 
technology in the country. First, international agencies like the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health began to refuse to fund Brazilian researchers, citing gaps in the ethical review of 
                                                          
22
 C Roitman, A Fagundes, G Penna and N Garrido, 'Relatório submetido à plenária final',  I 
Conferência Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia em Saúde, (Brasília, 1994); Associação 
Brasileira de Pós-Graduação em Saúde Coletiva, 'I Conferência Nacional de Ciência e 
Tecnologia em Saúde',  Boletim Abrasco vol. 54 (Rio de Janeiro: Abrasco, 1994). 
23
 Amy Nunn, The Politics and History of AIDS Treatment in Brazil; Kenneth C. Shadlen, 
Coalitions and Compliance: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Latin 
America (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
24
 Indeed, parallel to thes changes, in the 1990s Brazil also embarked on an accelerated 
process of integration into the global economy, including trade liberalization measures that 
could potentially harm domestic pharmaceutical firms.  
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multicenter protocols.
25
 As a result, Brazilian researchers began to demand that the MoH 
improve its calls for health research projects and that it urgently improve the ethical 
regulation of studies enrolling human subjects in clinical trials. In the absence of changes, 
Brazil’s participation in projects with major implications for world science, like the Genome 
Project, would be impossible in a context of insufficient regulation of research ethics. The 
second event that triggered the creation of the DECIT was an episode of environmental 
contamination in Rio de Janeiro. The Federal Attorney’s Office requested a technical report 
from the MoH on the contamination, and the Ministry’s report stated that prior studies had 
been incomplete and inadequate, signaling another shortcoming in health research in Brazil.
26
 
The creation of the DECIT thus marks an important landmark in the gradual introduction of 
science and technology policies within the MoH, and an effort at better coordination of such 
activities.
 27
  
We also witness the integration of health and industry under the direction of Health 
Minister José Serra (1998-2002), with the public production of antiretrovirals medicines 
encouraged as a way to meet the demands of the National AIDS Program.
28
 In this period we 
also observe reformulation of the institutions and rules for regulation of medicines and other 
health products, with the creation of an independent regulatory agency (ANVISA), and 
following that requiring drug manufacturers to adapt their manufacturing processes and plants 
to the new rules. Again, these changes should be regarded as incipient, the incremental 
integration of health and science, technology, and production policies. As important as the 
efforts to increase local production of antiretrovirals were, for example, they did not yet form 
part of a broad discussion on an industrial policy oriented toward the health sector, but rather 
were limited to responding to health needs in a single therapeutic class.  
The next incremental step on the path to building was the change in the leadership of 
the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) in 2003, following the 
election of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. At this point, the pharmaceutical industry 
                                                          
25
 Interview with Beatriz Tess, former director of DECIT, Ministry of Health, September 12, 
2014. 
26
 Ministério da Saúde, Exposição Humana a Resíduos Organoclorados na Cidade dos 
Meninos, Município de Duque de Caxias, Rio de Janeiro (Brasília: Ministério da Saúde, 
2003). 
27
 Importantly, the decisions were made in a context of economic stabilization in Brazil after 
decades of recession, which allowed expanding investments in S&T in general. The Ministry 
of Science and Technology also considerably expanded funding for research in various 
sectors and launched a discussion on a National Policy for Science and Technology.  
28
 Matthew Flynn, “Public Production of Anti-Retroviral Medicines in Brazil, 1990–2007,” 
Development and Change, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2008), pp. 513–536. 
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began to occupy a more privileged position in discussions of industrial policy, signaled as a 
key sector in the Industrial, Technological, and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE). The BNDES 
began debating the sector’s needs for the first time, as explained by Pedro Palmeira, Head of 
the Health Products Department at BNDES: 
 
[...] when Carlos Lessa took office at BNDES, we began to hear about 
the health sector as something in which the bank could play some role. 
The departments began to grow, and in the chemical industries 
department Lessa demanded a core group of people to focus on the 
health industry. There wasn’t anything at all, no systematic knowledge 
on the health sector. There was only a group of three people. We had a 
program from the previous Administration that was to try to develop 
the generics industry.
29
 
 
 Palmeira’s remarks illustrate the moment in which the bureaucracies in the health and 
industrial fields began to move in unison. As further illustrations, two seminars were held in 
2003 that aimed at identifying bottlenecks in the pharmaceutical industry that were 
problematic for the health sector.
30
 These events were important in that they drew together a 
segment of public health researchers who were sensitive to the issues of the production of 
medicines, technological development, and industrial policy. The BNDES invited groups of 
collective health researchers to participate in these events, and they prepared situational 
diagnoses that contributed to the elaboration of the Program to Support the Development of 
the Pharmaceutical Production Chain. This program, known as Profarma, and especially the 
component of the program oriented toward “innovation,” mark a milestone in investment 
management by the BNDES, which was now moving far beyond a traditional focus on 
financing manufacturing infrastructure processes. Many of the BNDES loans were to help 
firms command reverse engineering technology, for example by studying the path for 
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synthesizing reference products in order to manufacture generics, investments that were 
interpreted as innovation at the time.
31
  
 In parallel, and still in the early years of the Lula Governments, an “Innovation Law” 
was passed in 2004, decisively introducing innovation on the policy agenda. With some 
amendments to the original bill submitted in Congress during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
Administration, the Innovation Law updated the legal framework to encourage cooperation 
between science and technology institutions and the private sector, besides regulating the use 
and negotiation of the intellectual property produced through these collaborations. Previously, 
Brazil had no formal regulation allowing researchers from public universities and research 
institutes to engage in formal collaboration with private companies. Again, we observe a layer 
of science and technology policies initiated under the previous Administration and added to 
the government agenda under President Lula.  
When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took office as President of Brazil in 2003, in addition 
to the reorganization of the BNDES, the Ministry of Health also underwent fundamental 
restructuring. Various Secretariats were created in Ministry (Secretariats are the second 
echelon below the Ministry itself, and within Secretariats are Departments). This 
reorganization created various possibilities for what might happen to DECIT: eliminating it 
altogether, retaining it as a third-echelon department, or promoting it to the status of 
secretariat. The third of these options would indicate the importance that the Ministry as 
taking science and technology matters, and it was public health researchers invited to 
participate in the government’s transition team that suggeseted this option – converting 
DECIT into the SCTIE. 32  The transition thus provided an opportunity for reclaiming a 
longstanding demand by experts in the area of science and technology and health, namely the 
creation of a Secretariat that could better coordinate the research activities applied to the 
health sector and create a science and technology policy for the National Health System. As 
discussed, this demand had already been voiced at the ABRASCO Conference on Science and 
Technology in Health in 1994, but it had been only partially met to that point, with a third-
echelon Department. The creation of SCTIE would help the MoH take a strategic role in 
conducting science, technology, and innovation policy in health, coordinating activities across 
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these realms and doing so in a focused way from a single important division of the Ministry. 
Accordingly, SCTIE would become responsible for, among other things, the procurement of 
medicines, decisions on the incorporation and evaluation of new technologies by the health 
system, and the health research agenda itself.  
 In sum, the agenda for S&T in health was built gradually from the late 1980s through 
the early 2000s. Science and technology policies and health policies became more integrated 
in the wake of democratization, then further integrated under the leadership of Health 
Minister Serra, and then the agenda was moved to the next level in the 2000s under President 
Lula. Despite these changes, however, while private industry became targeted by other policy 
instruments and state agencies, as discussed avove, the private sector remained excluded from 
the Ministry of Health’s agenda. That next step in integration was yet to occur.  
 
Scientists as political agents:  
The experience with technology transfer and agenda-building in the Health-Industry Complex 
 
Historically, the bureaucracy of the DECIT, and of the Secretariat of Science, 
Technology, and Strategic Inputs (SCTIE) that succeeded it, was largely occupied by public 
health researchers working in the area of science and technology in health, and who provided 
crucial impetus for these actions.  
 The new staff of federal administrators in the SCTIE involved mostly researchers or 
administrators with experience in science and technology and health. One of the leading 
research clusters on science and technology in Brazil was at the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation 
(Fiocruz), a research institution linked to the MoH. And it was a group of researchers from 
Fiocruz, particularly those affiliated with the research group on “Development, Economic 
Industrial Complex, and Innovation in Health,” now occupying positions in the Ministry, that 
spearheaded initiatives in science and technology and health toward what would eventually 
become the “Health-Industry Complex.” In order to understand this reformist group’s agenda 
and proposals, it is important to contextualize the work by Fiocruz and, within Fiocruz, the 
role of this particular research group. 
One of the most important missions of Fiocruz is the production of inputs (medicines 
and vaccines) for the federal government’s health programs. Complementing the creation of 
the Secretariat within the MoH and the Profarma program at BNDES, Fiocruz launched a 
Four-Year Plan (2005-2008) which determined, as a priority, actions for the Health-Industry 
Complex and innovation chains. In doing so, researchers called attention to the need for 
15 
 
greater involvement by Fiocruz in the decisions made at the MoH; and it defined strategies to 
improve the production process for inputs for the National Health System.
33
 In this context, 
the “Development, Economic Industrial Complex, and Innovation in Health” research group 
launched a project called “Innovation in Health” with the objective of identifying support for 
the formulation of a multi-sector policy involving production, management, and technological 
development.
34
 The project was coordinated by researchers José Gomes Temporão (later 
Minister of Health from 2007 to 2011), Carlos Gadelha, Eduardo Costa, and Reinaldo 
Guimarães (all later secretaries of the SCTIE), and Paulo Buss (president of Fiocruz from 
2000 to 2008).  
The “Innovation in Health” Project and the production of inputs at Fiocruz had 
important consequences for developing an agenda for the Health-Industry Complex in the 
MoH.
35
 The coordinators drew on a conceptual base combining public health with economic 
development, and expecting the strategic use of the state’s purchasing power to shape 
industrial development. Gadelha emphasizes the systemic nature of Brazil’s approach to 
industrial policy in this area, marked by the focus on various sectors in the Health-Industry 
Complex and their relationships to the state and the international context, as well as on service 
providers (hospitals, outpatient clinics, etc.).
36
 Guimarães highlights the particular relevance 
of health for generating innovation, since it is one of the world’s prime areas of investment in 
research and development (R&D), in a context in which innovation is a key differential for 
national competitiveness in a globalized environment.
37
 For this group of researchers, the 
health sector was a key factor for economic development and innovation – and now this group 
had privileged access to corridors of power witin the Ministry of Health.  
With Fiocruz researchers occupying important positions in upper echelons within the 
MoH, the role of science and technology on the Ministry’s agenda became consolidated. The 
2
nd
 National Conference on Science, Technology, and Innovation in Health, for example, was 
followed by the National Policy on Science and Technology in Health, the National Agenda 
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on Research Priorities in Health, the creation of an agency to assess new health technologies, 
and the creation of a Policy for Technological Management for the National Health System.
38
 
The procurement of high-cost medicines was also re-centralized, whereas it had previously 
been the responsibility of the country’s 27 states, a move was important for improving the 
efficiency of government purchases of patented products and crucial for increasing the 
Ministry of Health’s bargaining power with the suppliers of these products. 39  All these 
initiatives had the support of, and were monitored by, the Working Group of Health, Science 
and Tecnhology of Abrasco, the network of public health scholars that had been active since 
the early 1990s.
40
 
 Driven by researchers within SCTIE, the Ministry of Health became increasingly 
concerned about the production of medicines and technology transfer in the 2000s. A critical 
event that inspired state activism here were the events around Minister Temporão’s decision 
to issue a compulsory license on the patent of efavirenz (EFV), an important antiretroviral 
drug that was in high demand by the National Aids Program. The decision came in 2007, 
following years of negotiations with the patent-holder (Merck), some of which had yieled 
price reductions but left the drug at a price that, because of the increased demand for the drug, 
was continuing to place substantial burdens of the health budget. This event underscored 
weaknesses in the production of medicines and the need to consider new alternatives for the 
production of ARVs.
41
 After all, the consortium of three companies that stepped up to supply 
the AIDS Program with EFV experienced difficulties producing the drug, and it was 
necessary to import a generic version from Indian companies (where the there was no patent). 
Ministry of Health officials agree that this situation was crucial for advancing initiatives for 
the industrial development of medicines.
42
 For the first time, the MoH sponsored a 
partnership between private Brazilian pharmaceutical and pharmo-chemical companies and 
the public laboratory Farmanguinhos with the guarantee of purchase of EFV production.  
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The involvement of private firms constitutes an important change. Prior to this period, 
though Brazilian firms had been the subject of some industrial policy measures, as discussed 
above regarding PITCE and BNDES lending, they were not regarded by health officials as 
central to the country’s health agenda. Yet the conflict over drug patents and the experience of 
the compulsory license triggered a greater dialogue began between the MoH and the 
pharmaceutical companies. In fact, the experience of using the Ministry of Health’s 
purchasing power to promote the Brazilian consortium for the local production of efavirenz 
served as an embryo for subsequent policies for the Health-Industry Complex, as explained by 
Minister Temporão, who led the process: 
 
The experience with compulsory licensing confirmed a view I already 
had, that we needed to develop a new path to what I call technological 
sustainability. In other words, it’s impossible to conceive of a system 
that’s intended to be universal, with quality, meeting all the needs and 
demands of Brazilian society, without addressing the issue of 
technological sustainability, without reducing Brazil’s degree of 
dependence on technologies in relation to cutting-edge knowledge 
produced by science, in medicines, vaccines, reagents, diagnostic 
equipment, and treatment.
43
 
 
 To conclude this section, we have seen that action by a group of researchers from 
Fiocruz that were working in SCTIE facilitated the fusing of the health and industrial policy 
agendas. A counterfactual effort suggests that if this group of researchers interested in the 
industrial development of health had not been occupying key positions in the federal 
bureaucracy, it is unlikely that the health policy agenda would have embraced the private 
sector and become integrated with industrial policy as it did. The measures taken by the 
BNDES for the pharmaceutical industry date to the end of the Cardoso Administration, with 
major expansion at the beginning of the Lula’s Presidency, but both were strikingly 
dissociated from health policy. It was not until the action by the group of researchers working 
within the SCTIE that these activities in science and technology, innovation, and industrial 
policy were aligned with health policy. This shows the crucial role of these reformist 
administrators in the process of building the Health-Industry Complex and illustrates the 
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layering process, while the science and technology and health institutions were evolving 
gradually.  
 
Layering in science and technology and health: 
Public-private cooperation for the development of medicines 
  
 Throughout the remainder of the Lula Presidency and continuing in the 
administrations of Dilma Rouseeff, the fusion of science and technology, health, and 
industrial policies became yet more accentuated. Health was treated as an economic 
development activity, and promoting industrial development in pharmaceuticals was regarded 
as critical for health. Drawing on the experience with efavirenz, the Ministry of Health 
expanded the consortium model to include the production of strategic medicines for the SUS. 
In contrast to bargaining with international pharmaceutical firms under the threat of issuing 
compulsory licenses, the SCTIE began to engage these firms and encourage them to establish 
partnerships and technology transfer agreements with Brazilian companies, at the same time 
further aligning health policy measures with the activities of the BNDES and the array of state 
agencies promoting innovation. This marked an unprecedented shift in Brazil’s health policy, 
with measures to promote science and technology for health aligned with industrial policy 
and, together, the consolidated initiatives targeting public and private actors throughout the 
pharmaceutical production chain. This section examines these changes. 
 A number of policy and institutional reforms serve to illustrate the alignment of health 
and industrial policies in Brazil. Regarding policies per se, the Ministry of Health’s adoption 
of a coordinated approach to industrial policy was reflected by the signing in December 2007 
of an agreement on Cooperation and Technical Assistance with the BNDES for the 
development of activities, programs, and studies with a view towards the development of the 
Health-Industry Complex.
44
 Linked to this, the “More Health” program was launched by 
Minister Temporão in December 2007, with a budget of BRL 5.1 billion (U$ 2.6 billion) from 
2008 to 2011. Based on the Fiocruz Innovatoin Project, the “More Health” program aimed to 
improve the industrial and innovative capabilities of private Brazilian pharmaceutical 
companies.
45
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Complemeting policy measures were institutional reforms within the Ministry of 
Health. The Ministry created a Department of the Industrial Complex and Innovation in 
Health (DECIIS), within the SCTIE, to coordinate the new focus on a wider array of “health-
related” areas, such as technological development, production, and innovation.46 Reflecting 
the Ministry of Health’s concerns with these broader areas, the official appointed as Director 
of the DECIIS was a career civil servant from the Ministry of Development, Industry, and 
Commerce, chosen precisely to help SCTIE improve its competence in industrial policy. And 
the Ministry of Health created an Executive Group of the Health-Industry Complex (GECIS), 
also within SCTIE, to facilitate dialogue with different government agencies and the private 
sector. The GECIS had the ambitious objective of better coordinating the various government 
initiatives to increase the sector’s competitiveness, besides assuming the responsibility for 
executing the pharmaceutical sector’s industrial policy. 
Not only did industrial policy gain a larger profile in the Ministry of Health’s 
activities, but the Ministry of Health became a key player in the design and implementation of 
Brazil’s industrial policy. In addition to the PITCE, discussed above, Brazil had two more 
major industrial policy plans in this period, the Policy for Productive Development (2008-
2010) under Lula and the Greater Brazil Plan (2011-2016) under Rousseff. Both of these, like 
the PITCE before them, targeted pharmaceuticals as a key sector.
47
 With regard to the Greater 
Brazil Plan, the Executive sought to coordinate and induce the stakeholders through (i) 
vertical action by executive committees responsible for specific sector agendas and (ii) 
horizontal measures to address inter-sector problems (measures to bolster exports, etc.). And 
it was GECIS that was designated as the body in charge of managing the health and 
pharmaceutical dimensions of this program. Not only did this designiation reinforce the 
leadership of the SCTIE team in conducting health industry policy, but it also facilitated the 
coordination of actions in science and technology in health and industrial policy with the 
MoH. Groups of business representatives and government agencies which had previously 
engaged in little dialogue with each other now had a common channel for dialogue and for 
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negotiating the conduction of health industry policy. This is evidenced by the minutes of the 
meetings of the GECIS, which are public and available on the Ministry of Health website.
48
  
 As for the execution of the components of the Health-Industry Complex in the Greater 
Brazil Program, an important observation is in order. Two main criticisms of this regarded (1) 
governance, with the decision to segment industrial policy and turn its execution over to 
government departments which purportedly lacked expertise in activities to promote industry 
and (2) fragmentation, in that the executive committees were broad and difficult to 
coordinate.
49
 However, our research on industrial policy for health suggests exactly the 
opposite. As we have shown thus far, the SCTIE had already developed important expertise 
on the health industry, and the MoH staff consisted of industrial policy experts capable of 
coordinating the execution of the Greater Brazil Program. In addition, allowing the inclusion 
of different groups in the executive committee not created a channel for dialogue among 
different stakeholders in the pharmaceutical sector for the first time. Such dialogue led to the 
creation of new industry associations, such as Grupo FarmaBrasil, which represents Brazil’s 
leading pharmaceutical firms, and Mobilização Empresaria pela Innovation (MEI), a network 
of business actors interested in collaborating to develop pro-innovation policies in Brazil.  
 Perhaps the most important illustration of the alignment between health policy and 
industrial policy is the establishment of a new form of public-private partnerships in Brazil, 
known as Partnerships for the Productive Development of Medicines (PDP). The SCTIE 
established partnerships between multinational research companies, public laboratories, and 
domestic industry for technology transfer in strategic medicines. Agreements were established 
for the production of medicines for AIDS, cancer, neglected diseases, and others. As of mid-
2017, 86 PDPs had been established that include biotech drugs.
50
 The incentive comes from 
the guarantee of purchase from the original manufacturer and later from the company that 
internalizes the technology.   
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The expression “Health-Industry Complex” also began to be used in the BNDES. 
Profarma, for example, was no longer regarded as “the program to support the pharmaceutical 
chain, but the program to support the development of the Health-Industry Complex.” 51 
Indeed, we witness the reformulation and reorganization of Profarma too, with two new 
component programs were created: Profarma Exportation and Profarma Public Producers, 
with the objective of stimulating exports in the Health-Industry Complex (especially 
pharmaceutical chemicals) and support for the public laboratories.
 52
 The process illustrates 
the gradual way these regulatory decisions were made and the coordinated action by SCTIE, 
marked by extensive dialogue with the Office of the President, government agencies in 
innovation management and industrial policy, and members of industry.  
Importantly, the policies for the Health-Industry Complex were not immune to 
criticisms and setbacks. First, pharmaceutical industry associations and civil society groups 
questioned the partnerships’ transparency, since it was not clear which criteria had been used 
to determine the list of priority products for the MoH or how the partners were selected.
 53
 In 
addition, a possible fraud in the PDP contracts was exposed while national elections were in 
progress, thus revealing weaknesses in the program’s governance.54 In response, the SCTIE 
launched a public consultation to draft a regulatory framework for the PDPs. According to 
Carlos Gadelha, Secretary of the SCTIE in 2014, the new regulatory framework is more 
detailed, forming a kind of shield to protect new contracts, and open to monitoring and 
evaluation.
55
  
 To conclude this section, and in light of recent political economic changes in 
Brazil, it is worth pointing to four observations which suggest that the measures aligning 
science and technology, innovation, industry, and health are consolidated and likely to persist. 
First, in the context of political instability, featuring the impeachment of President Dilma 
Rousseff and her replacement by Michel Temer, business associations from the state-owned 
and private pharmaceutical industry mobilized jointly to demand continuity in MoH policy.
56
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An industry analysis published in October 2016 suggests that the technology transfer projects 
have been kept on hold since 2015 due to the country’s political crisis, but that they still enjoy 
strong support from the Brazilian and multinational pharmaceutical companies.
57
 Second, 
following the replacement of Dilma, further investments in the Health-Industry Complex were 
included in the federal government’s Four-Year Plan (2016-2019) that sets the MoH budget.58 
Third, in spite of the strategic changes in financing from BNDES, the pharmaceutical industry 
is still a priority and enjoys specific financing in the area of the Bank’s horizontal lines.59 And 
fourth, outside of government, health institutions and researchers that had long supported the 
traditional public health model, in which the private sector played only a supporting role in 
the health system, are now publishing formal notes of support for the Health-Industry 
Complex and Ministry of Health after the transition to the Temer Administration.
60
 The civil 
society organizations associated with AIDS patients and their leaders and representatives, 
who have a history of struggle with multinational pharmaceutical companies, do not 
disapprove of the policies for the Health-Industry Complex – despite their strong criticism for 
the lack of broad channels for dialogue and greater transparency in the technology transfer 
negotiations.
61
  
  
Conclusion 
  
 This article analyzed the gradual integration of science and technology, industrial, and 
health policies in Brazil. Focusing on the role of health researchers and professionals as 
agents of change within the state, we examined this process of integration as occurring 
gradually and incrementally beginning in the early 1990s.  
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Historically, science and technology hardly recorded on the Ministry of Health’s radar 
screen – it was a peripheral issue and, to the extent that these topics were ever addressed, 
there was little coordination with other activities being undertaken by the Ministry. Yet in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, a group of health researchers began holding events on the links 
between science and technology and health, and subsequently developed a research agenda on 
the theme. As some of these actors then obtained positions in the federal bureaucracy, they 
were able to begin implementing measures to heighten the profile of science and technology 
in the Ministry of Health and join together these different policy areas. This constitutes an 
initial instance of layering. 
 In the 2000s, in the context of the Lula Government’s more explicit industrial policy 
agenda, public health professionals within the state were able to push for both organizational 
changes and policy reforms that would establish the seeds of a “Health-Industry Complex.” 
And, following the conflict with an international pharmaceutical firm over the price of a 
patented drug that was important to the National Aids Program, placing significant strain on 
the health budget, and revealing weaknesses in the country’s industrial base, these actors in 
the Ministry of Health exploited the the opportunity to adapt and expand a new model for 
technology transfer and the use of the state’s purchasing power to include other health inputs. 
Now the Ministry of Health was collaborating with the national development bank and other 
agencies in the state that worked directly with private industry, tying together science and 
technology, health, and industrial policy. This constitutes yet further layering.  
These changes took place gradually, and over a considerable period of time. The researchers 
driving the Health-Industry Complex had worked within Brazil’s health bureaucracy for 
years. José Temporão, for example, an important health professional who would become 
Minister of Health at a critical moment in the 2000s, had conducted research on vaccines and 
pharmaceutical production for decades.The broad trajectory is nicely captured by Carlos 
Gadelha, then-secretary of the SCTIE: 
 
Many people initially criticized the conceptual and political progress of 
science and technology in the health area, but much of what took place over 
these 20 years is due to the issue’s grasp by the Collective Health field, when 
the issue assumed a leading position on the agenda of the CNS [National 
Health Council]. We need an Economic Industrial Complex that serves the 
SUS as a whole, instead of only developing three “little niche products” for 
the global market. Either we agree that building the SUS requires a national 
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policy for science, technology, and innovation, or public health will not be 
possible for us.
 62
 
  
Based on these findings, three points merit attention. First, a notable aspect of the 
Health-Industry Complex is the focus on engaging with the private sector to meet the 
country’s health policy objectives, witnessed in terms of encouragement and subsidy of 
private firms as well as establishing the framework for partnerships. This marks a 
fundamental shift away from both the traditional approach of the Brazilian health community, 
which did not envision an important role for private industry, and public policy. Indeed, under 
José Serra’s term as Minister of Health under Cardoso witnessed a strictly state-led 
production agenda for ARVs, much closer to the traditional public health model. 
Second, the research suggests that traditional ideologies may be of little use in 
understanding health policy changes in Brazil. As we have seen, it was the “center-right” 
Cardoso Government that pursued a state-led strategy for the production of AIDS medicines 
exclusively by public laboratories, while it was the “center-left” Lula and Rousseff 
Governments that embraced private industry and even went so far as to adopt an approach to 
technology transfer from leading international.  
Third, the gradual and incremental nature of these changes should be underscored. It is 
common to regard the shifts discussed in this paper as resulting from a change in the President 
of Brazil, with the emergence of the PT Governments that promoted a broad industrial policy 
for the pharmaceutical sector.
63
 Yet by starting the analysis in 2003, after Lula’s inauguration, 
such an approach misses the incremental changes within the state bureaucracy that occurred 
previously, and that allowed the CIS to emerge, ultimately, in the 2000s. As we have seen, the 
researchers driving the Health-Industry Complex had worked within Brazil’s health 
bureaucracy for years. Our study suggests that the actions of reformist groups working within 
the Ministry of Health, and in particular their ability to gain increasing authority and exploit 
moments of crisis to engineer further changes, provides a stronger explanation for the Health-
Industry Complex and, more generally, the fusing of Brazil’s policies on health, science and 
technology, and industrial development. 
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Our study also contributes to the literature on industrial development in Latin 
America. We emphasize that policies for science and technology and innovation are crucial 
elements of an industrial policy. There is a consensus that one of the main challenges for 
industrial policies is their linkage to macroeconomic policies, but with little attention to the 
importance of aligning initiatives to foment innovation, science and technology, and local 
industries. The Brazilian case suggests that science and technology policy and industrial 
policy are may be regarded as two sides of the same coin, requiring coordinated action. 
Indeed, with the Pan American Health Organization reiterating the need for coordination 
among science and technology, pharmaceutical, and industrial policies to promote innovation 
and access to medicines
64, Brazil’s case can provide important lessons for the countries of the 
region about the potential paths and their challenges.  
 Further studies are needed to understand whether the Brazilian experience is virtuous 
in its effects in both the industrial sector and access to medicines. Successful industrial 
policies in late developing countries depend on disciplining and “reciprocal control 
mechanisms,” for example, and further research is needed to understand how such 
instruments are functioning in the case of Brazil’s new policies toward the pharmaceutical 
sector.
65
 At this point assessments of the impact of these policies are premature. There are 
some reports of important investments by Brazilian pharmaceutical companies that have 
increased their research portfolios motivated by the PDPs;
66
 studies that question this 
instrument as a way to reduce the cost of medicines;
67
 and analyses that question whether 
there is actual coordination between industrial policy and health policy.
68
 One of the main 
policy strides in the Health-Industry Complex is the establishment of a collaborative network 
for the production of medicines in the country. Important management instruments have been 
improved: (i) the consolidation of the commission to assess new health technologies, (ii) the 
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improvement of procurement mechanisms for high-cost medicines, with the centralization of 
these processes, and (iii) inter-ministerial coordination in a crucial sector for the country’s 
development. Thus far, the main publications and assessments on these activities have been 
produced by the government departments themselves and the researchers affiliated with 
them.
69
 Further studies by independent researchers will be essential, particularly in light of the 
serious crisis of confidence in the public sphere that currently marks Brazilian politics and 
society. 
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